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COMMENT
Public Health and Safety Hazards
Versus
Confidentiality:
Expanding the Mediation Door of
the Multi-Door Courthouse
Arlin R Thrush'

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Growth of Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution
The public's interest in and use of alternative forms of dispute resolution has
been in existence for hundreds of years.2 However, today's rejuvenated interest
in alternative forms of dispute resolution can be traced to the late sixties Since
that time, alternative forms of dispute resolution have been labeled the wave of the
future. The growth of alternative forms of dispute resolution can be seen in the
tremendous increase in programs offering dispute resolution services. In 1980,
there were approximately one hundred dispute resolution programs located

1. The author is currently a third year law student at the Cumberland School of Law at Samford
University in Birmingham, Alabama. He is a Certified Public Accountant licensed with the State of
Maryland, an active member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the
Maryland Association of Certified Public Accountants, and he spent five years working as a Certified
Public Accountant in the Washington, D.C. area before entering law school at the Cumberland School
of Law. This project originated from work conducted during a summer position with the American
Bar Association's Section on Dispute Resolution. Special thanks go to Larry Ray, Director of the
Section on Dispute Resolution, Prmc Kestner, Assistant Director to the Section on Dispute Resolution,
and Professor Henry Strickland of the Cumberland School of Law for their help and assistance in this
project and their comments on early drafts of this project
2. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3 (1985). Arbitration has been used
in the resolution of commercial disputes for hundreds of years, and mediation can be traced to the
religious communities of colonial New England. Id at 3.
3. Id at 3.
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throughout the United States.4 Today, there are over four hundred dispute
resolution programs available to settle disputes.5
B. Overview of Why PartiesHave Turned to ADR Mechanisms
Why have parties to legal disputes turned to alternative forms of dispute

resolution? There are at least six chief motivational aspects to this phenomenon.
First, concerns about chronic delay in the judicial system have forced parties to
disputes to locate other forums for settling their disputes.6 Second, concerns
about the rising costs associated with litigating a dispute have also encouraged
parties to seek other forums for settling their disputes.7 The third motivational
aspect is that courts are ill-equipped to handle certain types of disputes.'

The

fourth motivational aspect is that alternative dispute resolution programs have
proven to be a successful substitute for the dispute settlement roles that extended
families, neighborhoods, churches and communities provided in the past.9 The
fifth motivational aspect is that alternative dispute resolution programs are better

equipped to deal with a whole conflict rather than a particular legal infraction that

4. AMERICAN BAR ASsOcIATION, THE SPECIAL CoMMITrEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (1993).
5. Id.
6. See Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-Door Courthouse Idea: Building the Courthouse
of the Future... Today, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 7, 12 (1985). "Since 1960, federal case filings
have increased 900 percent in the courts of appeals and 250 percent in the district courts." Victor
Williams, Solutions to FederalJudicialGridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (Dec.-Jan. 1993). "Gridlock is
particularly acute in metropolitan jurisdictions, where federal judges are having to delay civil trials for
months, and even years, to accommodate criminal trial schedules in accordance with the Speedy Trial
Act." Id. at 185. See also 18 U.S.C. 3161-74 (1988); see generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS, Vol. 1,27-30 (1990); Haig, JudicialVacancies and Procedural
Reform, N.Y. LAw J., June 15, 1992, at 2. State courts have also experienced this problem. The
nation's largest court district, the Los Angeles Superior Court, has seen the median time to trial rise
from an average of six months in 1920 to over forty months in 1981. THE INSTITUTE for CIVIL
JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT, DOMESTIC RESEARCH DMvSION OF RAND 28-29 (April 1, 1992 - March
31, 1993). By the late 1980's, the time from filing to trial in Los Angeles Superior Court lengthened
to fifty-nine months. Id at 29.
7. Ray & Clare, supra note 6, at 88. In 1985, the total cost of tort lawsuits in state and federal
courts of general jurisdiction totaled an estimated twenty-nine to thirty-six billion dollars. THE
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at22. Approximately sixteen to nineteen billion dollars
of fourteen to sixteen billion
of this went to transaction costs resulting in net compensation to plaintiffs
dollars. Id at 22.
8. Ray & Clare, supra note 6, at 12-13. In addition, "Society's misperception of the role of the
courts has contributed to a dissatisfaction with the legal system, and consequently, to the growth of
alternative dispute resolution programs." Id at 13. "Most large city prosecutors in the nation are
confronted with scores of citizens each day who register what the citizens believe are criminal charges."
Id "In Philadelphia, about forty people bring complaints to the district attorney each day." Id. "On
the average, only four leave with a filed charge." Id. This is attributed to the fact that most agencies
do not view their role as comprehensive complaint handlers. Id
9. Id. at 13. For example, "a mother might have intervened in a dispute involving siblings, or
a priest might have aided communication between parish members." Id at 14.
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may be symptomatic of a much larger problem." Finally thesixth, and perhaps
the most important motivational aspect, as it applies to the concerns addressed in
this Article, is that the confidentiality granted is attractive to the parties to a
dispute.
Despite the tremendous growth in society's interest in alternative forms of
dispute resolution and the subsequent explosion in the number of programs
offering dispute resolution services, accessibility to these programs remains a
problem. Judge Earl Johnson of the California Court of Appeals addressed the
problem of accessibility at the National Conference on Minor Dispute Resolution,
which was held in New York City in May of 1977." Judge Johnson stated:
At present, it is almost accidental if community members find their way
to an appropriate forum other than the regular courts. Since these
forums are operated by a hodgepodge of local government agencies,
neighborhood organizations and trade associations, citizens must be very
knowledgeable about community resources to locate the right forum for
their particular dispute.'
C. The Birth of the Multi-Door Courthouse
In response to the problem of accessibility, Professor Frank Sander of
Harvard Law School developed the "Multi-Door Courthouse Dispute Resolution
Center."' 3 The ideal model proposed by Professor Sander included a center
offering sophisticated and sensitive intake services along with an array of dispute
resolution services under one roof.'4 A screening unit at the center would
"diagnose" citizen disputes, then refer the disputants to the appropriate "door" for
handling the case. 5
In 1985, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Dispute
Resolution transformed this idea into practice with the development of three
experimental centers.' 6 The centers were located in Washington, D.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma and Houston, Texas.' 7 In February 1989, the experimental center in
Washington, D.C. was declared a success and designated as a full operating

10.

Id at 13.

11. Id at 8. Professor Johnson was a member of the Special Committee on Resolution of Minor
Disputes from 1976-1981. He was subsequently appointed Associate Justice on the State of California
Court of Appeals, Second Appellate Distct, Division Seven, in Los Angeles. He has also been an
advisor to the Special Committee on Dispute Resolution. Id at 8-9 n.7.
d at 8.
12.
13. Id at9.
14. Id.
15.

Id.

16.

Id.
Id at 17.

17.
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Division of the Court by Chief Judge Fred B. Ugast, of the District of Columbia
Superior Court."8
D. Overview of the D.C. Multi-Door Courthouse Concept
The Multi-Door Courthouse involves direct hands-on service to assist in
determining the most appropriate dispute resolution mechanism available to resolve
a citizen's problem or dispute. 9 As stated earlier, the ideal Multi-Door
Courthouse model would include a center offering sophisticated and sensitive
intake services along with an array of dispute resolution services under one
roof.2" The chart on the following page visualizes the Multi-Door Courthouse
concept: 2
The Dispute-Complaint Diagnosis Center is at the center of the Multi-Door
Courthouse. It is here that the Multi-Door Courthouse in the District of Columbia
matches disputes with the appropriate ADR mechanism. This is accomplished by
employing the "Case Classification System." The Case Classification System
requires each party, upon case filing, to receive a Case Classification Form (see
Appendix A). Each party must complete and csubmit the form to the Multi-Door
Division of the Superior Court. The Division collects the responses and, for each
case, submits an ADR recommendation to the responsible Judge for use at the case
scheduling conference. At the scheduling conference the Judge informs the parties
of the ADR recommendation.
The Case Classification Form produces an ADR recommendation by
employing one of two techniques. The first is a categorical assessment (by virtue
of case type some cases will not be referred to ADR, or will always be referred
to a specific ADR mechanism). Part B of the Case Classification Form solicits the
necessary information to fashion a categorical assessment while Part A solicits
general information concerning the dispute. For example, all automobile cases
(Question A in Part B) will automatically be referred to arbitration. If a case does
not fit into one of the Part B categories, the questions in Parts C and D are used
to produce an ADR recommendation based on salient characteristics of the case
(Part C) and each party's stated goals in the processing of the case (Part D). The
final scores are compared, and the mechanism with the highest score is
recommended to the Judge.22

18. THE SPECIAL COMMrITEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ABA, MULTI-DOoR.
RESOLUTION DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DIsTIuCr OF COLUMBIA, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROGRAmS 1 (1993).
19. THE STANDING CoMmITrEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ABA, CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW
DEVELOPMENT OF HOUsTON's MULTI-DOOR KNOWN As THE DISPUrE RESOLUTION Cemr, THE
MULTI-DOOR EXPERIENCE: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE COURTHOUSE OF THE FUTURE 11-53

(1988).
20.
Ray & Clare, supra note 6, at 9.
21. Id at 10.
22. For a brief description of the ADR recommendation process based on salient characteristics
of the case and each party's stated goals in the processing of the case see Appendix B.
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E. Emerging Problems Within the Multi-Door Courthouse
However, as the Multi-Door Courthouse develops and matures into a
reputable institution, potential problems emerge.23 Perhaps, one of the most
critical is the conflict between public health and safety concerns, and the
confidentiality afforded parties to a dispute. This Article will address the
problems associated with mediating disputes within the Multi-Door Courthouse
that involve public health or safety hazards. The Article will begin by discussing
the increased use of sealed settlement agreements and sealed records in the judicial
system and then present the more common problems associated with granting
confidentiality in cases involving public health or safety hazards. The Article will
then present a growing trend in the courts to challenge the sealing of settlement
agreements and protective orders that are contradictory to public health and safety
concerns and a trend to open up discovery proceedings and discovery materials to
nonparties to a suit. The Article will then focus on the effects these trends may
have on the Multi-Door Courthouse and will conclude with a proposed
modification to the mediation door of the Multi-Door Courthouse in order to
protect the public's interest in safety while protecting the integrity of the MultiDoor Courthouse.24
II. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE SETTLEMENT OF LAWSUITS
A. Protective Orders, Sealing Orders and Settlement Agreements
Parties to a dispute have utilized a variety of methods to shield information
from public disclosure while taking advantage of the courts to resolve disputes. 25
The three principle methods currently used are: (1) protective orders for pre-trial
discovery materials under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2)
judicial sealing orders that apply to the entire record of a case; 26 and (3)

23. Although this article will be limited to addressing potential problems associated with the
mediation door of the Multi-Door Courthouse, these problems are by no means limited to the mediation
door, nor are they limited to the Multi-Door Courthouse. These problems have emerged throughout
the entire field of dispute resolution.
24. The author of this Article recognizes there are many types of disputes that may reach the
Multi-Door Courthouse involving a public health or safety hazard. However, this Article is limited to
a discussion of disputes involving products liability or medical malpractice disputes. For example, a
defectively designed product that has the potential of injuring a large segment of the public or a
medical malpractice suit questioning a medical professionals' competency.
25. Brian T. FitzGerald, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System GoingSecretly Private, 6 J.L.
& POL. 381 (Winter, 1990).
26. Id. at 381. "Total sealing orders remove from public view the identity of the parties, all pretrial discovery material, the contents of the pleadings, trial testimony, trial exhibits and the ultimate
resolution of the case." Id "The courts merely enter the sealed cases on their docket sheets as Sealed
v. Sealed." Id
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confidential settlements that the parties negotiate, often with minimal involvement
by the court.27
The sealing of court records and the enforcement of covenants of silence are
28
becoming increasingly common practices in the settlement of civil lawsuits.
Defendants typically request confidentiality to avoid disclosure of sensitive or
potentially damaging information, while plaintiffs' attorneys may agree to
confidentiality in an effort to obtain larger settlements for their clients. 29 The
reduction of transaction costs associated with settling a dispute as opposed to
litigating a dispute is yet another reason attorneys may agree to a cloak of secrecy.
In Dallas County, Texas, over two hundred sealing orders were entered in nonchild-related cases between 1980 and 1987, some of which involved allegations
of fatally defective products, environmental contamination or professional
incompetence.3 °
B. Problems Created by Granting Confidentiality
Although the terms of a settlement have traditionally been considered a
private matter between the parties,3' different concerns surface when the judicial
system participates in the secrecy by sealing the file and ordering the parties not
to discuss the case except among themselves.32 This form of confidentiality is
sometimes viewed as being antithetic to the very foundation of our legal
system.33
Our legal system is founded on the premise that secret justice is inherently
suspect.34 When cases presented for resolution in the public forum are
surrounded with secrecy there is a natural tendency to question whether justice is

27.

Id at 381.

28.

Anne-Therese Bechamps, Sealed Out-Of-Court Settlements: When Does The Public Have

A Right To Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 117 (1990). See also FitzGerald, supra note 25,
at 381; Russ Herman, No More Dirty Secrets in the Courts, ATLA ADVOCATE, Oct. 1989, at 4. But

see John F. Rooney, Issue of Sealed Files, Secrecy in the Courts Won't Be Swept Under the Rug, 1
CH. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 20 1991, at 1 (reporting that judges feel that comparatively few sealing
orders are issued).
29. Bechamps, supra note 28, at 117.
30. Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access To Public Courts: Discouraging
Secrecy In The PublicInterest, 69 TEX. L. REv. 643, 644 (February, 1991). See also McGonigle,
Judge Says Privacy Can Help Settle Suits, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 22, 1987, at A24, col. 1.

31. Bechamps, supra note 28, at 117. See also In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D.
468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
32. Bechamps, supra note 28, at 117.
33.

See, e.g., Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 316, 196 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876

(1983) (holding that a stipulated order of confidentiality is contrary to public policy, contrary to the
ideal that full and impartial justice shall be secured in every matter); Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C.
404, 407-08 (1894) (stating that any attempt to maintain secret court records is inconsistent with the
common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record to which all persons have the right

of access).
Charles J. Reed, Confidentiality and the Courts: Secrecy's Threat to Public Safety, 76
34.
JUDICATURE 308 (Apr-May 1993).
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In other words, our legal system places a
being equitably administered."
premium on public accountability when it comes to resolving disputes between
members of our own society. The problems created by granting confidentiality
were summarized by Judge H. Lee Sarokin in his article entitled Justice Rushed
Is Justice Ruined. Judge Sarokin wrote: "Judicial decisions serve two main
functions. They resolve the immediate dispute between the parties and they often
provide guidelines for future conduct. A settlement denies that opportunity."36
Judge Sarokin went on to say that some settlements are consummated for the very
purpose of precluding the establishment of requirements for future conduct or for
precluding the establishment of precedent that might affect other cases." Some
examples of Judge Sarokin's concerns include the payment in a single case to: (1)
conceal discriminatory practices in a large company; (2) conceal the existence of
a dangerous product used by many others; (3) conceal a patent's invalidity, which
if known would promote competition; or (4) conceal the existence of corrupt or
fraudulent practices in business or government.38 In other words, in many
instances the public's interests are disserved by settlement. 9 This is especially
true in cases involving life-threatening dangers known to a product manufacturer
4°
but kept secret from the public through a confidentiality agreement.
Confidentiality agreements, whether entered into upon a court order or
voluntarily, have also prevented law enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well
as the public, from acquiring critical information.4' As New York Attorney
General Robert Abrams stated, "Sealed settlements make it very difficult for
government officials to determine links between environmental exposure to toxic
chemicals and health effects .... It is important that, in the future, when judges
records and data that may
are asked to approve secret settlements, they not seal
4
have an impact on the public health and welfare., 1

35. Bechamps, supra note 28, at 156.
36. Judge H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38
(Spring 1986).
37. Id at 433.

38.
39.

RUTGERs

L. REV. 431, 433

Id.

Id.See also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (May 1984); Kevin
Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 25 (Vol. 1).
40. Reed, supra, note 34, at 308. See also Weiser, Forging a 'Covenant of Silence', THE
WASHINGTON POST, March 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
41. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 30, at 649.
42. Id at 649. See also Freeman & Jenner, Just Say No: Resisting Protective Orders, TRIAL,
Mar. 1990, at 66, 70.
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C. The Legislative Response to These Problems
Since the late 1980's, there has been a national movement to limit the
availability of protective orders covering documents and information produced
during discovery, particularly in products liability actions. 43 This translates into
an ever-expanding movement to require the disclosure of settlements dealing with
public health and safety hazards.44 To that end, more and more states are passing
new laws requiring disclosure of settlements, or revising their rules of procedure
to modify common practices involving confidentiality of discovery, protective
orders and sealing of litigation records.45
For example, in 1990, the Texas Supreme Court adopted Rule 76(a) of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.46 Rule 76(a) recognizes that all court records
are entitled to the presumption of openness, which can be overcome only by a
showing of specific, serious and substantial interest in sealing such records that
would outweigh any adverse effect on health and safety.47 Under the Texas rule,
court records include all documents filed in court as well as unfiled discovery
material and settlement agreements.48
Florida passed a statute similar to the Texas rule. Florida's statute is known
as the "Sunshine in Litigation Act. ' 49 The Act forbids courts from entering an
order that would conceal a "public hazard," defined as a "device, instrument,
person, procedure, product or a condition of a device, instrument, person,
procedure or product that has caused and is likely to cause injury."50

The Act

also makes any agreement to conceal a public hazard unenforceable and grants
standing to the public and news media to contest court orders or agreements that
would conceal public hazards.5
North Carolina and Virginia have also passed laws toughening the rules
allowing the sealing of court documents.52 Additionally, for every state that has
passed a "secrecy" statute there is a handful with such a measure now pending in
the legislature.53 The number of state legislatures addressing the secrecy issue
43. Richard A. Rosen et. al., New Developments In State Protective Order Legislation And
ProceduralRules, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 301, 303 (May 20, 1993).
44. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public 4ccess to Private Settlements: Conflicting Legal Policies,
11 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 85 (June 1993).
45. Id at 85.
46. Id. at 86. Tx R. Clv. P, 76(a).
47. Reed, supra note 34, at 310.
48. Id
49. Id. See also FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (1990).
50. Reed, supra note 34, at 310. '
51. Id
52. Open Secrets: Courts Rejecting Routine Sealings of Civil Cases, 9 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITGATION 66 (May 1991). However, the North Carolina law only prohibits the State
from participating in sealed settlements. Id
53. Id. In California lawmakers are considering a bill to curb sealing of papers in cases
involving public hazards. Id. Bills have or will be introduced as well in Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Washington and Wisconsin. Id
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is a signal to the judiciary that the public policy supporting confidentiality must
give way to the public's "right to know" in cases which signal danger to those not
privy to the lawsuit.54

D. The Judicial Response to These Problems
There is a lengthening line of cases granting greater access to discovery
materials to the public, the press and parties in other cases.5 These discoveryaccess cases span the gamut of issues, ranging from a civil RICO suit implicating
the Iran-Contra affair,5 to the landmark Agent Orange case," to some tobacco
product-liability litigation.58 In light of these trends, it appears that mediation
will become even more attractive to parties concerned with maintaining
confidentiality.
H.

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE

The Multi-Door Courthouse and mediation are especially susceptible to the
tension created from the clash of confidentiality and public accountability. Using
the Multi-Door Courthouse as a vehicle to conceal information when its release
would avert danger to the public's health and safety, will sacrifice the public's
interest in accountability and jeopardize confidence in the integrity of the Multi-

54. No Sealing?, 8 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST oF LITiGATION 160 (October 1990).
55. See Stone v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the public's right of access to judicial records and documents may be abrogated only in
unusual circumstances); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
presumption of access must be indulged to the fullest extent not incompatible with the reasons for
closure); In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
the existence of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is beyond dispute); Sloan
Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504, 506 (D. Colo. 1902) (rejecting an agreement between
the parties to remove testimony and exhibits on file in the clerk's office and noting that the inspecting
and taking copies of public records is as old in the law as the records are old); Pantos v. City &
County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 263, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492 (1984) (holding that
judicial records are historically and presumptively open to the public and there is an important right
of access which should not be closed except for compelling countervailing reasons); C.L. v. Edson,
140 Wis. 2d 168, 182, 409 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (finding a compelling public
interest in disclosing sealed documents although private individuals were involved and stressing that
public records and court documents are subject to a strong presumption in favor of disclosure).
56. In that suit U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green of Washington, D.C. refused to issue a
protective order barring the press from attending the deposition of a witness. Avirgan v. Hull, 118
F.R.D. 252 (D.D.C. 1987).
57.
The massive amount of discovery in the Agent Orange class action was kept sealed
throughout the protracted case. Afterwards, when some class members wanted to unseal the documents
for dissemination to the press and public the Second Circuit largely allowed it. In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2nd Cir., 1987) cert. denied, Dow Chemical Co. v.
Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1987).
58. In a New Jersey federal court, the Third Circuit allowed plaintiffs to distribute discovery
documents with some restrictions. Liggett Group Inc. v. Cipollone, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
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Door Courthouse. The wisdom of Justice Brandeis wisdom still rings true today:
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." 9 As stated earlier, confidentiality is one of the main reasons parties
to a dispute turn to alternative forms of dispute resolution, which includes
mediation.
There are many arguments in support of maintaining confidentiality within
the mediation context. However, the more common arguments are as follows:
1.

Granting confidentiality encourages the use of mediation and encourages
openness and frankness within mediation sessions. 6 0 Without a
guarantee of confidentiality it would be difficult to develop an
atmosphere of openness necessary to encourage disputants to reveal the
underlying cause of the dispute. 6' This openness and frankness is what
stimulates settlement.62

2.

Without confidentiality, cooperation would be limited by a party's fears
that any statement made or information provided in the mediation
session would be used to that party's disadvantage in subsequent civil
or criminal proceedings.63

3.

Mediators who testify or convey information to investigative agencies
might be viewed by potential mediation participants as biased and
thereby rendered ineffective. 6" Part of the success of a mediation
program is based on the credibility and neutrality of both the program
and the individual mediators. 6' The mediator must be neutral in order

59.

Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 30, at 644. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

How

THE BANKERS USE IT 92, (1914).
60. NANCY H. ROOERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION/LAw/POLICY/PRACTICE 99 (1989).
See also United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
61. Lawrence Freedman, Christopher Haile & Howard Bookstaff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
A Practioner'sGuide, ABA PUB. SERVICES Div. OF SPECIAL COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 80
AND

(1986).
62. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 60, at 99. In Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd. v. Connelly
Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2nd Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

commented:
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that transpires
during these sessions then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves
in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in a high
stakes game than adversaries, attempting to arrive at a just solution of a civil dispute.
Id. at 99.
Eileen P. Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11
63.
CAP. U. L. REv. 181, 197 (1981).
64.
ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 60, at 99. See also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227
(11th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
65. Friedman, supra note 63, at 198.
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to make constructive suggestions concerning behavior and attitudes of
the parties based on their responses and expressions in the session."
4.

mediating if
Mediators, especially volunteers, might be deterred from 67
there is the possibility of subsequent subpoenas to testify.

5.

In some instances, confidentiality is desired to protect against the
dissemination of proprietary or competitive information. This is a
danger present in a wide range of litigation matters, including trade
secret and patent disputes, restrictive covenant litigation and customersupplier disagreements.6"
A. Authorities GrantingConfidentiality In Mediation

There are several authoritative sources granting confidentiality in the
mediation context. They include: (1) the common law; (2) the Federal Rules of
Evidence; and (3) various state statutory provisions. A review of these authorities
will help shed light on the underlying policy that helped create them in the first
place - the encouragement of openness and frankness within the negotiating
context. The earliest authority behind the granting of confidentiality in settlement
negotiations was the common law. However, at common law, only the actual
offer of settlement was excluded from evidence in a trial.69 "Statements of fact"
were admissible unless they were stated hypothetically, expressly made "without
prejudice" or so intertwined with an offer or acceptance that it could not have been
understood without reading the two together. 0
However, this traditional doctrine of not excluding statements of facts
discouraged the freedom of communication in attempting to compromise.7' As
a result, the common law rule of excluding only the actual offer of settlement was
expanded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.72 Federal Rule of Evidence 408
(Rule 408) provides that an offer of compromise shall be inadmissible to show
liability or invalidity of a claim." Rule 408 extended the exclusionary protection

66. Id at 198.
67. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for
Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 37, 38 (1986).
68. James J. Restivo, Jr. & Debra A. Mangus, SpecialSupplement- Confidentialityin Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE IIGH COST OF LITGATON 5 (May, 1984).
69. Kent L. Brown, Confidentialityin Mediation: Status and Implications, 1991 J. DISP. RESoL.
307, 312.
70. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, section 266, at 466 (4th ed. 1992).
71.
Id
72. Brown, supra note 69, at 312.
73. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states:

Evidence of(l) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to

compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount Evidence of conduct or
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to include all statements made in compromise negotiations. 74 Compromise
negotiations have been held to include settlement agreements, whether made
during a mini-trial, mediation or elsewhere."
While affording substantially more confidentiality than the common law, Rule
408 is far from a guarantee of complete confidentiality of the information
presented in a mediation session.7 " For example, courts have ruled that
statements can be outside the scope of Rule 408 because they were sufficiently
unrelated to settlement;" the rule's scope is limited to compromise discussions
about a claim that is in dispute as to validity or amount;78 Rule 408 excludes
from protection materials "otherwise discoverable;" 79 and finally, a major gap in
the protection against admissibility under Rule 408 is that the evidence is
inadmissible only if used to prove "liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount."8 In addition to the evidentiary loopholes referred to above, Rule 408
fails to bar public disclosure of the substance of the proceedings by those present
at the mediation session.8'
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (Rule 501) is another authority supporting
confidentiality in certain situations. Rule 501 gives the courts the power to grant
a common law privilege to the mediation context. 2 However, no court has
extended this privilege to the mediation context without statutory support.83

statements made incompromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EviD. 408.
74. STRONG, ET. AL., supra note 70, at 466.
75. ROGERs & McEWEN, supra note 60, at 100-101.
76. Brown, supra note 69, at 313.
77. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 60, at 105.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Id at 107. In other words, this permits a party to use information obtainable through the

discovery process even though the same information was revealed during settlement. Id.
80. Id.
81. Brown, supra note 69, at 314. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I1(e)(6) is the criminal
counterpart to Rule 408. However, Rule 11 only bars evidence of offers to plead guilty.
82. Id. at 315. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501.
83. Brown, supra note 69 at 316-317.
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In response to the limitations of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
guaranteeing complete confidentiality, numerous states have passed statutes
granting confidentiality to the mediation context.84 These statutes enable the
side-stepping of most of the potential pitfalls concerning confidentiality. These
state confidentiality statutes appear to be the most effective and viable means
available to protect the exchange of information during mediation."5
A contract entered into between the parties which stipulates that information
disclosed in a mediation session is to remain confidential is yet another means of
avoiding some of the potential pitfalls concerning confidentiality. Although the
effectiveness of confidentiality agreements is uncertain, these contract situations
appear to be increasing in number."6
In short, the Federal Rules of Evidence have attempted to assure more
confidentiality in settlement negotiations, including the mediation context, than
afforded by common law. However, the limited effectiveness of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, as previously stated, has led numerous states to adopt statutes
granting confidentiality to the mediation context. Parties to a dispute have also
attempted to limit the shortcomings of the Federal Rules of Evidence by entering
into contractual agreements forbidding disclosure of information discussed in the
mediation context.
B. ConfidentialityAnd The Public's Health And Safety
The ill-effects of confidentiality are readily visible by reviewing a recent case
brought before a jury in early 1993. In that case, Shannon Mosely, a 17-year-old
boy, was driving a 1985 General Motors (GM) pickup truck near Atlanta, Georgia.
As he passed through an intersection, he was struck broadside by another vehicle.
The impact of the collision caused his truck to burst into flames, burning him to
death. An autopsy revealed there were no other serious injuries sustained in the
collision.

84. Id. at 317. The following fourteen states have confidentiality statutes or court rules
concerning confidentiality: Arkansas; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Iowa; Florida; Michigan;
Montana; New Hampshire; New York; New Jersey; North Carolina; Oklahoma; and Oregon.
85. Id.
86. Id at 320. See also Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding a compelling need to protect the confidentiality of labor mediations between police officers
and the city); Illinois Education Labor Relations Board v. Homer Community School District No. 208,
132 Il. 2d 29, 547 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1989) (finding the existence of a strong public policy protecting
the confidentiality of labor negotiating strategy sessions); People v. Snyder, 129 Misc. 2d 137, 492
N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that the public policy of the state was to insure a
mediation atmosphere free from restraint and intimidation by guaranteeing absolute confidentiality);
Byrd v. State, 186 Ga. App. 446, 367 S.E. 2d 300 (Ga. App. 1988) (concluding that confidentiality
was essential to the integrity of the mediation process); Minnesota Education Association v. Bennett,
321 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a statute authorizing confidential mediation sessions
permitted a private caucus between a school board and an employee of the school district
notwithstanding the open meetings law).
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Shannon's pickup was .one of nine million similar vehicles made by GM
between 1973 and 1987. The fuel system of Shannon's truck was designed so that
the two gas tanks were placed on each side of the truck outside the frame rails.
According to testimony during a trial brought by Shannon's family, GM had been
aware of hundreds of fuel-fed fires in its trucks since the late 1970s. The
plaintiffs alleged at trial that the fires were caused by GM placing the tanks
outside the frame of the trucks. The plaintiffs further alleged that the tanks were
susceptible to crushing and rupturing in a side impact. There were internal crash
test reports introduced during the trial revealing that GM trucks using the sidesaddle fuel tank design were three to four times more likely to burst into flames
than trucks where the tanks were located inside the frame. Even though GM had
settled numerous cases involving death caused by this design, the reports and crash
test results revealing this extraordinary safety hazard were kept secret from the
public until this case was brought to trial. Court-sanctioned confidentiality
agreements and protective orders had prevented access to this critical information.
On February 5, 1993, an Atlanta jury returned a $101 million verdict against GM.
The verdict was intended to deter and punish GM for what the jury found to be
an intentional concealment of a safety hazard.8'
A research project conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice has concluded
that the number of complex, high-stakes cases typified by product liability suits,
such as the GM case, and medical malpractice suits, are increasing dramatically."8
The incidence of secrecy in complex, high-stakes litigation has increased
dramatically as well. 9 The incidence of secrecy has increased to the point where
stipulated protective orders have become an accepted part of the complex litigation
landscape. 9 The practice of insisting on secrecy is the universal rule among
defense lawyers representing manufacturers. 9 "A Defendant's Primer," published
by the Defense Research Institute,' instructs counsel representing manufacturers
to "routinely seek a protective order limiting dissemination of documents, even
though defense counsel can make no special claim of confidentiality."93
However, in this highly complex society, where technological advances in product
development blur the consumer's comprehension, it is vital that safety information

87.
See Moseley v. General Motors, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1994). See also Reed, supra note 34,
at 308.
88. THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 18-20. The research project involved
examining cases in two large urban jurisdictions from 1960-1984. id. at 18. The initial database

included Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco, California. Id. The database was then extended to
the rest of California. Id.
89.
90.

FitzGrald, supra note 25, at 381.
Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV.

1, 1 (1983). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (stating protective orders have been used so frequently that a degree of standardization is
appearing).
91. Reed, supra note 34, at 308.
92. Id at 308. See Kearney & Benson, Preventing Non-Party Access to Discovery Materials
in Products Liability Actions: A Defendant's Primer, 1987 CURRENT IssuEs n4 L. & MED. 36, 37.

93.

Kearney & Benson, supra note 92, at 40.
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known to a manufacturer also be available to the public. 94 Unfortunately, the
struggle for competitive advantage has induced manufacturers to sweep product
deficiencies under the rug to the consumer's serious detriment.95

C. Some Support the Piercingof Confidentiality
in the Mediation Context
In response to the dilemma of providing the public with appropriate safety
information, some commentators have suggested piercing confidentiality in
mediation cases involving public health or safety concerns.96 Courts, however,
have come down on different sides of this issue for a variety of reasons.97 As
a result, 98the current grounds for protecting confidentiality in mediation are
uncertain.

Some commentators argue that there are many more cases where
confidentiality should be broken. 9 The Code of the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) states:
Maintaining confidentiality is critical to the dispute resolution process.
There may be some types of cases, however, in which confidentiality
should not be protected. In such cases, the neutral must advise the
parties, when appropriate in the dispute resolution process, that the
confidentiality of the proceedings cannot necessarily be maintained.
Except in such instances, the neutral must resist all attempts to cause
him or her to reveal any information outside the process.i
However, this standard does not provide a criterion for recognizing which cases
fall into the "some types of cases" category. In other words, there does not appear
to be a principled way of identifying the types of cases the drafters of the Code
envisioned falling into this category.'' It is also unclear when the mediator is
under a duty to withdraw from mediation and when the mediator is under a duty

94.
Reed, supra note 34, at 310. Reed argues that the courts exist to allow our society to
function effectively for the well being of its citizens. Therefore, judges who have firsthand knowledge
of a danger to the public have a duty to safeguard the public when possible. Id Reed further argues
that secrecy violates the policy behind Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
that the rules be interpreted to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."

Id
95.
96.

Id
Freedman & Prigof& supra note 67, at 39.

97.

Id.

98. Id
99. Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality inMediation:A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL.
25, 25.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id.
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This ambiguity allowing a mediator to breach
to report information.
confidentiality in "some types of cases" tends to undermine the mediators
neutrality and damage the mediator's integrity. Furthermore, the decision to
breach confidentiality depends on the discretion of the mediator handling a
particular case. In turn, this leads to inconsistent standards in determining which
cases confidentiality should be broken.
As the interest in the Multi-Door Courthouse combine with an increased
interest in locating a forum granting confidentiality, it is extremely important that
the Multi-Door Courthouse be prepared to effectively and efficiently handle cases
involving public health or safety hazards. In order to accomplish this goal, the
mediation door of the Multi-Door Courthouse must be expanded. The goal of
such an expansion needs to address the public's concern for accountability as well
as safeguarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Multi-Door Courthouse.
IV. EXPANDING THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE
Modifications to the Multi-Door Courthouse should begin at the DisputeComplaint Diagnosis Center, which is located at the center of the Multi-Door
Courthouse. The proposed modifications would include: (1) the identification of
disputes that may affect the public's health or safety; (2) the determination of
whether it is feasible to mediate such a dispute; and (3) the formalization of the
mediation process.
A. Identifying Disputes Involving Public Health Or Safety Hazards
The initial step in expanding the mediation door of the Multi-Door
Courthouse would require identifying disputes that involve public health or safety
hazards. This identification process could be accomplished by modifying the
"Case Classification System" currently utilized by the Multi-Door Dispute
Resolution Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Modification would entail expanding Part B of the Case Classification Form (see
Appendix A) to include questions as to whether the case involves: (1) a claim for
personal injuries or property damages possibly caused by a defectively designed
or manufactured product; and (2) an action alleging professional incompetence or
medical malpractice. A check in either of these two boxes would categorically
refer the case to mediation.
B. Determining The Feasibility Of Mediating The Dispute
After the identification of a dispute involving a public health or safety issue
has been achieved, the mediator assigned to the dispute by the courthouse would
need to determine the feasibility of mediating the dispute. This would entail a

102.

Id
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more active role on the part of the mediator in the mediation process as compared
to a mediator's traditional role.
The initial step in determining the feasibility of mediating the dispute would
require identifying who, if anyone, could adequately represent the public's interest
in maintaining consumer safety and protecting the public from incompetent
professionals. Some possibilities might include allowing a representative from a
consumer interest group or a representative of a federal regulatory agency to be
present at the mediation table to ensure that the public's safety is not being
jeopardized. The responsibility of determining who should represent the public's
concerns needs to be handled by the mediator because parties directly involved in
a dispute rarely consider the interests of unrepresented interests voluntarily.
However, identifying a public representative creates the problem of
determining which consumer interest group or federal regulatory agency should
represent the public's interests. One possible solution to this problem might entail
composing guidelines for the mediator to follow in public sector disputes, such as:
(1) guidelines for defining the various stakeholding interests in dispute resolution
and methods of identifying their legitimate spokespersons; (2) guidelines listing
the objectives and standards of conduct to be followed by the mediator; (3)
guidelines outlining the prescriptions about the terms of final agreement and the
monitoring and implementation of such agreements; (4) guidelines regarding
ethical standards to be followed by the mediator; and (5) perhaps requiring lawyermediators or mediators trained in the substantive law concerning these issues to
preside over the proceedings.
The approach of allowing the mediator to take a more active role in the
mediation process is similar to the mediation techniques utilized internationally.
In international mediation, the mediator maintains overt control over the
proceedings and plays a much more active part in the development of the
settlement.
The mediator's more active role should also include the exploration of
potential obstacles to the mediation context. 3 Such obstacles include: exploring
issues of fundamental values that cannot be compromised; determining the
unwillingness of a party to participate knowing someone other than the parties to
the dispute may be present at the mediation table; determining if the dispute
involves disagreements over factual information; and determining if there are
issues too numerous or too complex to mediate."° If any of these obstacles
arise during the feasibility analysis, the mediator should determine whether it is
°
possible to structure the mediation sessions so as to minimize these obstacles.'
It would also be important that the parties acquire some understanding of the
°
The
implications of the term "consensus" before agreeing to participate."

103. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 100 (January 1990).
104. Id
105. Id.

106.

Id at 99.
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definition of the term "consensus" is key to the success of the negotiations. °"
Generally, in a practical sense, consensus has meant that no interest represented
opposes the decision on the item under consideration.'"8 Achieving consensus
does not necessarily require a formal yes or no vote, nor is it necessary that each
interest represented affirmatively like the decision, merely what is necessary is that
a party does not, or will not, oppose the decision if implemented."° The parties
should be offered the chance to define consensus in their own way and to decide
on how consensus will be recognized by the mediator." ° The feasibility analysis
should also include a discussion between the parties of a set of tentative ground
rules for the negotiations.
After the mediator gathers the preceding information, the results of the
findings would need to be summarized and a determination made as to the
feasibility of mediating the dispute. The steps required in the Case Classification
System would now entail: (1) each party, upon case filling, to receive a Case
Classification Form (see Appendix A); (2) each party completing the form and
submitting it to the Multi-Door Division of the Superior Court; (3) upon
submission of the form, the Multi-Door Division of the Superior Court assigning
a mediator to the case; (4) the mediator determining the feasibility of mediating
the dispute as outlined above; and (5) upon completion of the feasibility analysis,
the mediator submitting an ADR recommendation to the responsible Judge, who
would use the recommendation at the case scheduling conference.
If one of the obstacles referred to above or the public's interest in obtaining
information about a potential health or safety hazard can not be adequately
protected, the mediator should recommend that the dispute proceed to trial rather
than attempt to mediate the dispute. However, if the mediator determines
mediation is a feasible option and submits a mediation recommendation, the Judge
at the scheduling conference should obtain a formal commitment from the parties
to participate in the negotiations (assuming the Judge agrees with the mediators
findings). Finally, the parties must also be willing to negotiate in good faith.
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the modifications referred to in this Article appear to deviate
substantially from traditional mediation processes. However, there are numerous
examples of programs where the traditional mediation process has not been
followed. These programs have proven just as successful in encouraging
settlement between the parties as the more traditional models. For example, in
Columbus, Ohio, many mediation sessions involving domestic violence require the

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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attendance of a local representative from the Battered Women's Center."' In
Matin County, California, mediators employ neutral third-party investigators to
obtain background facts and information concerning a dispute." 2 The mediators
then consult with the investigators for their perspective of the situation before
hearing the parties accusations." 3
The institutionalization of mediating public disputes is not a new
phenomenon. In 1985, Hawaii's Chief Justice Herman Lum founded a four year
experimental program called the Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution (the
Center)." 4 In 1989, the Hawaii State Legislature created the Center through the
passage of legislation which had a two year sunset provision." 5 During the
1992 legislative session, the sunset provision was removed and the Center became
a permanent part of the Judiciary." 6 The purpose of the Center is to mediate
complex litigations or disputes that affect the public interest or that involve state
and local government.""
Although the programs referred to above, including the Multi-Door
Courthouse, have proven to be successful, any new approach or modification to
an existing dispute resolution mechanism must be carefully designed and
implemented in order to safeguard it's legitimacy and effectiveness. This Article
encourages others to think about the problems and ramifications of mediating
disputes within the Multi-Door Courthouse that involve public health and safety
hazards as well as stimulate the creation of a mechanism that accommodates both
interests of successful mediation and the need for public information.

I11. Interview with Larry Ray, Director of the Dispute Resolution Section of the American Bar
Association, in Washington, D.C. (July 22, 1993).
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Telephone interview with Peter Adler, Director of the Judiciary Program on ADR,
Honolulu, Hawaii (July 8, 1993).
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id
Id
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APPENDIX A

Superior Court of the District of Columbia
Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Division

Alternative Dispute Resolution
Case Classification Form
You
This form is confidential. It will not go in the case file.
are required to submit it to the Multi-Door Division 20 days prior
Sending instructions are in
to your Scheduling Conference.
Section E.
A. Pleasefill in the information below:

lar No.:

Calend

Civil Action No.:
Case Name:
Your Name:
Telephone (including area code):

Approximate amount of the claim in this case: $
Date of Scheduling Conference:
-' Plaintiff of Plaintiffs Attorney

You are:

-- Defendant or Defendant's Attorney
B. Is this case (check all that apply)
-- a claim for personal injuries or property damages arising out of
a motor vehicle accident?

[A]
0]

E3 one involving Constitutional claims?

[2]

EI

a request for a declaratory judgment?

[3]

[

an action for libel of information?

[4]

El

an asbestos injury claim?

[5]

[l

a request for injunctive relief?

[6]

El

an action for subrogation of a debt?

If you checked any of the items in Section B, skip to Section E
below. Otherwise, complete sections C, D and E.
FORM CONTINUES ON REVERSE SIDE
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C. Check all that apply in this case:

l

[1]

There are multiple plaintiffs or defendants.

[2]

0

I will be representing myself antfIwithout a lawyer.

[31

[3

The case involves more than monetary issues.

[4]

El

[5]

El There are highly technical or scientific questions in the case.

[6]

El

[7]

[l

There is a continuing business or personal relationship between
the parties.

There is more than one issue involved.
An insurance company will be responsible for all or part of the
claim.

[9]

El This is a contract case.
El This is a tort case and liability is in question.

[101

El This is a tort case and liability is not in question.

[8]

D. Of the following, select up to three important goals for you in this case.
Place a 1 by the most important, 2 by the second-most importantand 3 by
the third-most important. You may also select one, two or no goals.
[11]

Settling the case as quickly as possible, if the outcome is fair.

[12]

Keeping the outcome of the case private.

[13]

Receiving an expert's non-binding opinion about the case.

[14]

Limiting the amount of pre-trial discovery required.

[15]

Having a say in the outcome of the case.

[16]

Reserving some relationship with the other party.

[17]

Receiving a binding opinion that settles the case.

[18]

Avoiding having to negotiate with the other side.

[19]

Having someone decide who was right and who was wrong.

[20]

Other (please specify):

[21]

None of these goals are important to me.

E. Please mail this completedform to:
Case Analysis Specialist
Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Division
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Room 4242
Washington, DC 20001
Or, FAX the form (both sides) to 202-879-4619
If you have questions about how to fill out thisform properly, or about other matters
relating to Alternative Dispute Resolution and your case, you may call the Case
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss2/3
Analysis Specialist at 879-7869. Thank you.
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The following example represents the mechanics of producing an ADR
recommendation based on salient characteristics of the case and each party's stated
goals in the processing of the case.
Litigants are given a brief list of statements (Part C) and asked to check all
that apply in their case. Each of the objective factors have been chosen because it
has been judged to make one ADR mechanism more attractive over another, all
other things being equal. These relationships have been codified in the following
table, in which each ADR mechanism receives a base weight of 1.00 for each
question.
Weights
MED ARB
Question
No.
CEC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00

Multiple plaintiffs or defendants
Party is pro se
Case involves more than monetary issues
Continuing relationship between parties
Highly technical or scientific questions
More than one issue involved
Insurance company liable in full or part
Contract case
Tort case, liability in question
Tort case, liability not in question

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
3.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
2.50
1.00
2.00
2.00

Each weight other than 1.00 indicates the increased relative attractiveness
enjoyed by an ADR mechanism when the particular objective factor is present.
An initial score for each ADR mechanism is derived by simply adding the
individual weights for each question that is checked. Each of the three scores is
then multiplied by up to three subjective factors calculated form the responses to
Part D of the form. Litigants are asked to select, in order of importance, three
important goals in the processing of their case. As with the objective factors each
ADR mechanism is given a relative weight for each goal.
No.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Qeto
Speed of resolution
Keeping outcome private
Receiving expert non-binding opinion
Minimizing pre-trial discovery
Having a say in outcome of case
Preserving relationship w/ other party
Receiving binding opinion
Avoiding negotiations w/ the other side
Having someone decide right and wrongt

MED

Weights
ARB

CEC

1.00
1.50
1.00
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.00
1.00
1.00

1.25
1.00
1.00
1.25
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.50
1.25

1.00
1.50
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.25
1.25
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However, these weights are not used "as is," since the litigants have selected
three goals in order of preference. Each weight is first multiplied by a "priority
multiplier" according to whether the goal in question was ranked first, second or
third in importance. These priority multipliers are:
Multiplier
1.50
1.25
1.10

Priority
1
2
3

For example, if a litigant's first priority was avoiding negotiations with the
other side (question 18), the weights for mediation (MED), arbitration (ARB) and
case evaluation (CEC) would each be multiplied by 1.50, producing respective
final weights of 1.50, 2.25 and 1.87. The three weights of the litigant's second
priority would be multiplied by 1.25, and so on. In this way each ADR
mechanism is given a final weight for each of three goals.
In the final step, the initial objective score for each ADR mechanism is
multiplied by each of the three subjective goal weights. In schematic form the
process for each ADR mechanism is as follows:
Objective Score x (Goal #1) x (Goal #2) x (Goal #3) = Final Score.
Each litigant thus produces three numeric scores, one for each ADR mechanism.
The scores from all litigants in each case are combined and the ADR mechanism
with the highest total score becomes the recommended ADR route. Therefore, a
hypothetical case might produce the following results:
Plaintiff
Defendant #1
Defendant #2
Totals

9.20
10.30
10.30
29.80

11.45
6.44
7.52
25.41

8.86
7.72
7.35
23.93

In this hypothetical case, mediation, by virtue of its higher total score, would
be the recommended ADR mechanism. It should be noted that ties are resolved
first in favor of mediation and second in favor of case evaluation (i.e., mostconsensual over least-consensual).
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